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Abstract 
This is Chapter Eight (Warlord) of Harvesting Pa Chay's Wheat: 
The Hmong and America's Secret War in Laos, scheduled for 
publication in March 2000. The chapter chronicles the events 
that led to Vang Pao's rise to commander, and warlord, of the 
second military region. It also describes the political 
machine he created, a vast system of patronage and graft 
designed to co-opt clan notables (many of them potential 
political rivals) and, if this failed, a program of 
assassination for trouble-makers. Vang Pao also acquired wives 
from various clans to forge ties to clan leaders. To induce 
ordinary Hmong to support the war effort he spawned, with CIA 
money and sponsorship, a massive system of welfare that would 
eventually make more than a hundred thousand Hmong dependent 
on him for their survival.  
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The Coalition Collapses 
 
[1] 
 
The 1962 Geneva accords obliged 
America to withdraw all military 
personnel from Laos. Nearly eight 
hundred individuals, including 
military attachés, advisors to the 
RLA, MAAG staff, and the members of 
the White Star teams, packed up and 
left the country.{1} Even the White 
Star's new logistics center at Sam 
Thong was abandoned with supplies 
still on warehouse shelves and in 
dispensary cabinets. Hmong quickly 
swept over the facility and carried 
everything away.{2} 
[2] 
 
Washington also ordered the CIA out of the country. The 
entire Vientiane station moved to Bangkok, but two of Lair's 
agents, Tony Poe and Vinton Lawrence, illegally remained 
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high-profile to stay behind, so he set up a temporary 
headquarters for his paramilitary operation at Nong Khai, a 
Thai village across the Mekong from Vientiane. The location 
kept Lair close to his Hmong, but it lacked security. Local 
villagers and complete strangers wandered into his facility. 
Lair finally transferred his headquarters to Udorn Air Base 
in Thailand. The CIA owned property there, a rundown wooden 
bungalow just off the huge concrete runway constructed by 
the US Strategic Air command in the early 1950s. The 
bungalow was designated with a simple sign as building AB-1. 
[3] 
 
Lair moved into AB-1 and set up shop along with Roy Moffit 
who was in charge of CIA paramilitary operations in southern 
Laos. For the rest of the war AB-1 would remain the 
headquarters for all CIA paramilitary operations in Laos, 
though it would be torn down and rebuilt in 1967. Friendly 
congressmen on tour continually responded with disbelief 
when shown the dilapidated bungalow and told it was the 
nerve center for a major paramilitary operation in Laos. 
Over Lair's objections (he liked things small and simple) 
the CIA had AB-1 torn down and replaced with a two-story 
office building to better fit the image of a high-powered 
operation.{3}  
[4] 
 
In the beginning, Lair's work at AB-1 was circumscribed. He 
was not allowed to ship arms and supplies to the Hmong or 
sponsor more training. However, Washington did authorize 
humanitarian aid for the Hmong and this gave Lair plenty to 
do. He channeled funds into Edgar Buell's refugee relief 
program and oversaw the logistics of getting supplies into 
the field. It wasn't the same as fighting a war, but at 
least it kept the Hmong from starving.  
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North Vietnam honored the Geneva agreement by infiltrating 
additional troops into Laos to augment the nearly twenty 
thousand Pathet Lao already in the field.{4} Vang Pao's 
intelligence network reported a steady stream of North 
Vietnamese trucks carrying troops and supplies down Route 6 
from Vietnam onto the Plain of Jars. American Voodoo jets, 
high-flying twin-engine reconnaissance planes, also 
confirmed the presence of the truck convoys in their aerial 
photographs.{5} By the fall of 1962, the North Vietnamese 
had expanded their presence in Laos to ten thousand men.  
[6] 
 
One reason for the buildup was the failure of the Pathet Lao 
to bring Kong-Lê into their fold. He took his neutralism 
seriously and was openly critical of the Pathet Lao's 
slavish dependence on the North Vietnamese, calling them kap 
kap (the Lao expression for toads) because of their penchant 
for aping the North Vietnamese obsession with digging 
trenches.{6} Kong-Lê had forty-five hundred troops under his 
direct command, distributed over the Plain of Jars, in the 
Ban Ban Valley, and at Xieng Khouangville. Another fifty-
five hundred were scattered throughout central Laos in small 
garrisons. Once Hanoi realized it could not count on these 
troops and might very well have to face them in combat, the 
decision was made to dramatically expand the presence of the 
NVA.  
[7] 
 
In March 1963 a sudden escalation in clashes between 
Neutralists and Pathet Lao forces began to unravel the ten-
month-old coalition government. Pathet Lao antiaircraft guns 
shot down two American transport planes, killing two U.S. 
pilots, attempting to deliver supplies to the Neutralists. 
This incident caused the Kennedy administration to 
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Phouma, who had so often championed the coalition idea, 
began to question its viability, especially after receiving 
confirmation of a buildup of North Vietnamese forces in his 
country.{7}  
[8] 
 
In the end it was the communists who scuttled the coalition 
by assassinating two of Kong-Lê's top officers. The 
Neutralists retaliated, gunning down Quinim Pholsena on the 
front steps of his Vientiane residence. A former librarian 
and part-time radical, Quinim had jumped on the Pathet Lao 
bandwagon and wangled the post of foreign minister in the 
coalition government. Outspoken in his support of the 
communists, he made an ideal target.  
[9] 
 
Not wanting the revolution to lose a second hero, and with 
memories still green of his year in jail after the collapse 
of the last coalition government, Souphanouvong vacated his 
post as deputy prime minister and fled to his cave 
headquarters in Sam Neua. The other communist deputies soon 
joined him, returning like salmon to their natal stream.  
[10] 
 
With the coalition government no more, the Pathet Lao 
stepped up military action, especially against Neutralist 
forces. For months the communists had been cutting back on 
the food and military supplies going to Kong-Lê. Now they 
ceased delivering anything at all. In mid-April, NVA and 
Pathet Lao units assaulted all Neutralist strongholds on the 
Plain of Jars. Believing Kong-Lê's army would be destroyed 
without outside support, Kennedy authorized covert 
deliveries of supplies to the Neutralists and directed the 
CIA to do what it could to save them from annihilation.  
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Back In Business 
[11] 
 
Bill Lair used the directive as a pretext for reopening the 
weapons pipeline to his Hmong. With support from the Thai 
military, he secured a two-story building at Udorn Air Base 
to warehouse supplies and weapons. The building would become 
the principal supply headquarters for all U.S. paramilitary 
operations in Laos for the rest of the war.  
[12] 
 
With weapons again arriving at Long Cheng, Lair persuaded 
Vang Pao to conduct a series of diversionary actions on the 
Plain of Jars to draw the communists away from the 
Neutralists. Vang Pao went a step further and ordered Hmong 
to fight alongside the Neutralists garrisoned at Lat Houang 
and Ban Ban Valley.  
[13] 
 
The Hmong at Lat Houang came directly from Long Cheng and 
were battle-tested. The Hmong at Ban Ban were only members 
of a local ADC. Vang Pao airdropped arms and supplies to the 
irregulars and sent them a leader, one of his best officers, 
Major Chong Shoua Yang. Over the next year Chong Shoua 
hardened the ADC into a formidable guerrilla unit that kept 
the Pathet Lao out of Ban Ban Valley.  
[14] 
 
Despite the help, Kong-Lê remained suspicious of Vang Pao 
and the Americans. To win him over, Washington recalled CIA 
agent Jack Mathews from Africa. Prior to his Africa 
assignment, Mathews had worked closely with Kong-Lê, 
Page 6 of 72 Hmong Studies Journal
4/26/2005 http://members.aol.com/hmongstudies/HSJv3_Quincy.htmlsupporting his 2nd battalion in the field. The two men had 
parted on good terms. Mathews spent three weeks with Kong-Lê 
on the plain, time enough to secure an agreement from Kong-
Lê to establish a permanent network to receive arms and 
ammunition from the U.S. The logistics support, plus the 
intercession of Vang Pao's guerrillas, forced a stalemate 
that saved the Neutralists, at least for the moment. A fly-
over by a high altitude U-2 spy plane equipped with high 
resolution cameras revealed the communists were busily 
expanding their logistics on the Plain of Jars, preparing 
for something big.{8}  
[15] 
 
Over the next ten months fighting was sporadic. Kong-Lê's 
garrisons held, but three of Vang Pao's momentum sites were 
overrun and lost.{9} The communists had their own setbacks. 
Hanoi was using Route 7 to move troops and supplies to NVA 
garrisons onto the Plain of Jars. Bill Lair decided to close 
the road down. In August 1963, he sent in PARU demolition 
specialists to supervise the operation. The Thai organized 
twelve platoons of elite Hmong troops and deployed them 
along the road at strategic passes and bridges. Each platoon 
dug ten holes to receive cratering charges. The charges, 
plus C-4 explosives, were airdropped to each platoon by Tony 
Poe.  
[16] 
 
The demolition job was a huge success. Along one stretch 
explosions blew the road entirely off the side of a 
mountain.{10} The flow of troops and supplies to the plain 
slowed to a trickle. Hanoi rushed NVA labor battalions in to 
clear away the debris, reconstruct the road, and rebuild 
bridges.  
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[17] 
 
It would take five months for North Vietnamese work crews to 
finish rebuilding Route 7, giving Vang Pao the breathing 
space to hit the communists further north. When Tony Poe 
first signed on with Momentum, his job was to establish dirt 
airstrips northeast of the Plain of Jars so STOL aircraft 
could deliver arms and supplies to Hmong volunteers. Poe was 
now doing the same thing again, but on a much larger scale. 
For months he had been expanding the Momentum network, 
having Hmong clear mountain landing sites throughout 
northern Laos, many of them behind enemy lines. 
[18] 
 
Air America pilots flew PARU teams and CIA agents to many of 
these distant locations to initiate new guerrilla 
organizations, reinvigorate those that had been allowed to 
languish, and train volunteers for ADCs. Poe used 
helicopters from Thailand to ferry Hmong troops to the new 
airstrips so they could launch surprise assaults against 
distant Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese posts. The most 
ambitious of these assaults was an attack on the Pathet Lao 
stronghold at Sam Neua City.  
[19] 
 
While crisscrossing the northern highlands searching for 
potential landing strips, Poe had stumbled on the remnants 
of former RLA battalions thought to have been destroyed when 
the Pathet Lao took over Sam Neua Province in late 1960. The 
soldiers were concealed in highland villages, and survived 
by raiding Pathet Lao supply stores. To get the soldiers 
back in uniform and working for him, Vang Pao promoted their 
commander, Major Khamsao Keovilay, to the post of military 
subdivision commander for Sam Neua and deputy governor of 
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[20] 
 
Recruitment through promotion was standard procedure in 
Hmong politics. Touby had used the technique to raise 
guerrilla units quickly. Loyalty was to clan, and only clan 
chieftains had the ability to call up hundreds of volunteers 
for military service almost overnight. The drawback was that 
clan nabobs were politicians and not warriors. Giving them 
command over troops risked bungled campaigns due to 
incompetent leadership.  
[21] 
 
Khamsao was a trained officer and had survived for nearly 
three years behind enemy lines, so Vang Pao was not putting 
a rank amateur in a top leadership slot. The day would come, 
however, when he would be so desperate for new recruits to 
fill his depleted ranks that he would give literally 
anyone‹Hmong, Khmu, or Lao‹a command position if he could 
deliver enough warm bodies for duty.  
[22] 
 
Poe airdropped supplies and ammunition to Khamsao and helped 
with the training of his troops. Soon Poe had three 
battalions combat-ready for a surprise assault on the 
communist bastion at Sam Neua City. Vang Pao contributed two 
Hmong companies to the force and added a fourth battalion 
commanded by one of his best officers, and brother-in-law, 
Major Sao Ly.  
[23] 
 
The campaign to take Sam Neua City began with a diversionary 
action. Three of the four battalions overran a Pathet Lao 
garrison north of the target, then circled east around it. 
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meet the challenge. With the capital only lightly defended, 
the fourth battalion struck from the west and took 
possession of city.  
[24] 
 
It was a brilliant operation that caught the communists 
totally off-guard. By contrast, the RLA had nothing to show 
for itself but a dismal season of military defeats, reason 
enough to belittle Vang Pao's victory. But since former RLA 
battalions took part in the campaign, the armchair generals 
in Vientiane chose to celebrate it as their own. For a brief 
moment Vang Pao was a national hero. The RLA general staff 
promoted him to general.  
[25] 
 
What went unnoticed by the RLA's top brass, but not by Lair 
and the other CIA case officers on the scene, was that a 
major factor in the campaign's success was the exemplary 
performance of Major Sao Ly who had commanded the only Hmong 
battalion in the operation. Having followed the major's 
career with some interest, Lair was convinced Sao Ly had the 
potential to become another Vang Pao. Lair talked to his 
PARU teams about grooming Sao Ly to take over for Vang Pao, 
if he were killed.  
[26] 
 
Vang Pao was furious when he learned of the plan. A short 
time later, Sao Ly was murdered by his own troops. According 
to one of the top PARU officers at Long Cheng, Vang Pao was 
not "displeased by the turn of events."{11}  
 
 
Another Coup 
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With praise of Vang Pao stinging his ears, Phoumi yearned to 
score a brilliant victory of his own. In November 1963, he 
launched a multi-battalion campaign in the upper panhandle. 
The CIA had advised against it, but Phoumi arrogantly 
ignored the counsel. The offensive began with a roar and 
ended in a squeak.  
[28] 
 
Things went well at first. Phoumi's battalions pushed right 
to the edge of North Vietnam's border, with Pathet Lao units 
in the area unexpectedly pulling back, giving ground. Phoumi 
crowed victory until three NVA battalions suddenly 
materialized to maul his troops. Phoumi rushed in 
reinforcements. The North Vietnamese hit them hard and sent 
them reeling. Pathet Lao troops waiting in the wings 
reappeared to savage the retreating RLA. For Phoumi it was 
one more humiliation in an already long list of 
embarrassments.{12}  
[29] 
 
Except for Phoumi's botched offensive, the RLA's top 
generals stayed out of the field. They had other fish to 
fry. Souvanna Phouma had recently met on the Plain of Jars 
with representatives from the Neutralists, Rightists, and 
Pathet Lao to see what could be done to bring an end to the 
fighting. He thought he had come up with an idea that would 
be attractive to both the Neutralists and communists: move 
the seat of government away from Vientiane's nesting ground 
of Rightists cliques to Luang Prabang and start again from 
scratch. To his astonishment the Pathet Lao blustered, 
complained, and generally dug in their heels, revealing they 
had no interest in a ceasefire under any conditions. The 
prime minister was stunned, then completely disheartened by 
their intransigence. He announced his intention to resign.
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[30] 
 
Sensing a power vacuum forming, the Rightists contemplated a 
coup. But this time there was dissension in their ranks. 
Resentment against Phoumi had reached a boiling point. As 
one Lao politician put it, "none of us with property and 
servants can be deemed wholly above corruption, but Phoumi . 
. . has become extremely greedy."{14} Phoumi controlled the 
narcotics trade in Laos and even ran an opium den in 
Vientiane, a seedy ramshackle building that handled 150 
addicted smokers a day. Narcotics netted him about a million 
dollars a year. Breaking with the Lao tradition of spreading 
graft among the ruling elite, he shared very little of the 
drug profits with the other Rightists. General Ouane 
Rattikone, who managed Phoumi's sprawling opium 
administration, received only two hundred dollars a month. 
And General Kouprasith Abhay, who commanded MR V where most 
of Phoumi's drug deals were made, was cut out of the drug 
profits entirely.{15}  
[31] 
 
In the past, resentment against Phoumi was held in check by 
the looming figure of Phoumi's cousin, Thai strongman Sarit 
Thanarat. Sarit commanded the Thai armed forces and had once 
offered to commit Thai troops to help Phoumi defeat his 
political enemies. Fear of Sarit had always been Phoumi's 
trump card, but Sarit had recently died. Phoumi was now on 
his own.  
[32] 
 
General Abhay moved quickly to take over the government, 
elbow Phoumi aside, and co-opt his drug empire. His co-
conspirator was General Siho Lamphouthacoul, a man from 
Abhay's hometown and head of the national police, 
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from his political enemies. By pirating the best units from 
the RLA, Siho had shaped the police into a formidable 
military force, which he advertised by sending his police 
against Nong Boualo, a Pathet Lao bastion close to the Ho 
Chi Minh Trail. RLA battalions had assaulted the stronghold 
many times before and were humiliated on each occasion. 
Siho's police units routed the communists within a few days.
{16}  
[33] 
 
During the evening of April 18, 1964, on Abhay's orders Siho 
sent two of his battalions into Vientiane to occupy the 
airport, radio station, and the national bank. His troops 
arrested Souvanna Phouma, all pro-Neutralist officials, and 
numerous French diplomats. For added effect, some of Siho's 
soldiers looted Kong-Lê's Vientiane residence. With the 
capital secure, Abhay called for a special convocation of 
the national assembly to force a settlement that would fill 
the cabinet with Rightists. Phoumi was never consulted, nor 
was a place made for him in the new government.{17}  
[34] 
 
U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger was out of the country at the 
time, meeting in Saigon with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. 
Unger rushed back to Vientiane and, in the company of the 
French ambassador, sought out the prime minister at his 
residence. Rightist soldiers in battle fatigues, their 
rifles slightly raised to appear menacing, stood guard at 
the house. The soldiers informed the two diplomats that the 
prime minister was not receiving visitors.  
[35] 
 
Unger checked if there were guards posted at the sides of 
the two story white stucco mansion. There weren't. He had 
Page 13 of 72 Hmong Studies Journal
4/26/2005 http://members.aol.com/hmongstudies/HSJv3_Quincy.htmlhis driver take the car to the side of the house. Unger 
shouted the prime minister's name. Souvanna Phouma appeared 
on his French balcony and the two shouted back and forth for 
several minutes, Unger assuring Souvanna Phouma of America's 
support, and the prime minister expressing his gratitude. 
The French ambassador found the exchange quite amusing; 
"Ah," he exclaimed, "diplomacy à la Romeo and Juliet."{18}  
[36] 
 
Once Unger confronted him with a threat to cut off all 
American aid, Abhay agreed to return Souvanna to power, but 
only on condition that Rightist officers, about eighty in 
all, be placed in positions of authority. Souvanna accepted 
the condition and resumed as prime minister with the 
intention of reasserting his political independence. 
However, being surrounded daily by newly appointed Rightists 
had its effect. Only a month after returning to power 
Souvanna Phouma announced plans to merge the Neutralist and 
Royal armies.  
[37] 
 
Conspicuously, Kong-Lê would not receive a position in the 
merged army's high command. It was an obvious maneuver to 
end the military independence of the Neutralists and 
subordinate them to the authority of the Rightists. When 
Kong-Lê did not protest the proposal, it was understood on 
all sides that for all practical purposes he had gone over 
to the Rightists. In protest, several hundred left-leaning 
Neutralist soldiers bolted to the Pathet Lao.  
[38] 
 
While the political center had been moribund for some time, 
there was at least its prostrate body to fight over, giving 
life, if only flickering, to neutralism and the coalition 
idea. It kept minds active hatching schemes to manipulate 
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even if they were only shouting at each other. Most 
important, it gave both sides an option besides armed 
conflict, an incentive to talk as well as to fight.  
[39] 
 
The communists had allowed Kong-Lê a token presence on the 
Plain of Jars because neutralism discomfited the Rightists 
and kept the door ajar for coalition politics. Now with 
Kong-Lê in the Rightist' camp, he ceased to serve any useful 
purpose, and posed a military threat. In a joint operation, 
NVA and Pathet Lao battalions assaulted the Neutralist 
strongholds at Khang Khay, Phong Savan, Ban Ban Valley, and 
Xieng Khouangville. To avoid annihilation, Kong-Lê withdrew 
his forces to the western edge of the plain.  
 
 
The War Takes A Nasty Turn 
[40] 
 
A prime target of the communist offensive was the Hmong ADC 
militia at Ban Ban Valley, commanded by Chong Shoua Yang. 
For nearly a year Chong Shoua had frustrated communist 
efforts to raze the Neutralist garrison at Ban Ban by 
holding the high ground, principally the mountain villages 
of Pha Ka and Phou Nong. The Pathet Lao repeatedly tried to 
dislodge the ADC from the two villages, but on each occasion 
fell short. During the April 1964 offensive, the communists 
went after Chong Shoua with four battalions, three of them 
NVA, unleashing a deadly artillery and mortar barrage that 
tore the two mountain villages apart.  
[41] 
 
Chong Shoua retreated, leading his militia and what was left 
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continued to drop from the sky, striking not only Pha Ka and 
Phou Nong but blasting several other villages nearby. These 
civilians also fled for their lives. The flood of refugees 
quickly exceeded fourteen thousand, fleeing in three 
separate groups. In the past the communists had not bothered 
to waste bullets on fleeing refugees, but this time they 
kept up the harassment, driving them on.  
[42] 
 
One group of six thousand was hounded by a small force, then 
driven up into the highlands and herded into a bowl-like 
depression. Waiting for them was a much larger force of four 
hundred NVA already in position around the edges of the 
basin. The harassing force pulled back to give the Hmong a 
false sense of security. The four hundred communists lying 
in wait watched patiently as the refugees below made camp 
and tended to their children.  
[43] 
 
By midnight most of the refugees were asleep. Suddenly, eyes 
popped open and heads jerked at the whoosh of shells exiting 
mortar tubes. Dozens of Hmong had already begun to scatter 
when the missiles exploded, kicking bodies into the air. 
Bullets from AK-47s tore into the encampment. The refugees 
ran blindly in the dark from one side of the basin to the 
other, trying to find an escape route, each time rushing 
directly into another deadly rifle barrage.  
[44] 
 
Above, on the rim, an order was barked out in Vietnamese. 
Soldiers dashed down the hillsides, screaming like banshees, 
most running at full tilt but a few on the steeper inclines 
sliding by the seat of their pants over slick limestone to 
get at the Hmong. When they reached the basin the NVA troops 
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clumps of people, shooting until their magazines were empty, 
then drawing their knives to slash at arms and shoulders and 
stab at stomachs and backs. A few soldiers picked up small 
children and swung them like sacks, bashing their heads 
against rocks.  
[45] 
 
During the height of the killing, a few Hmong discovered an 
escape route and called out to the others. There was a 
massed rush to get away. The Vietnamese went after them in 
the darkness, slitting the throats of some stragglers, 
disemboweling others, and shooting yet others in the leg so 
they could be left and finished off at leisure later. Bodies 
littered the refugees' escape route, life still ebbing from 
a few who had survived a stabbing or bullet wound, groaning 
in pain and pleading for someone to help them. By early 
morning the Vietnamese gave up the chase. Sides heaving, 
their black pajama uniforms encrusted with blood, they were 
finally exhausted from their butchery. Nearly thirteen 
hundred Hmong, including women and children, lay dead, 
carved up like livestock in a slaughterhouse.{19}  
[46] 
 
The Vietnamese took two hundred survivors prisoner. The rest 
of the approximately forty-five hundred Hmong who had 
escaped the carnage and eluded capture walked forty miles to 
Muong Meo, a village with an airstrip that had become a 
magnet for thousands of other Hmong displaced by the 
communist offensive on the eastern edge of the Plain of 
Jars. More than twenty thousand refugees were already 
assembled, waiting to be evacuated. Air America transport 
planes arrived the next day and ferried refugees nonstop to 
Vang Pao's SGU training camp at Muong Cha.  
[47] 
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For the Hmong the war had taken a nasty turn.  
 
 
Rapprochement With Kong-Lê 
[48] 
 
During his retreat Kong-Lê had set up temporary headquarters 
at Ban Khong on the plain's southwestern rim. He would soon 
establish permanent headquarters a few miles northwest at 
Muong Soui where Neutralists troops were already garrisoned. 
Moung Soui was next to Route 7 and had an airfield, making 
it easy to resupply by both land and air. And at this moment 
supplies were foremost on Kong-Lê's mind.  
[49] 
 
Lulled into complacency by Hmong victories in Sam Neua 
Province and the demolition of Route 7, the U.S. had slowed 
the delivery of provisions to Kong-Lê's forces. The frayed 
uniforms of his troops were in tatters, their worn-out 
combat boots splitting at the seams. Some of his units were 
already out of ammunition. Kong-Lê pleaded for supplies and 
reinforcements to keep his army intact. While Vientiane air-
shuttled a thousand Neutralists garrisoned near the capital 
to the edge of the plain to fortify Kong-Lê's positions, 
Washington authorized an emergency airlift to deliver 
canvass boots and new uniforms recently purchased from 
Japan, plus four hundred new rifles and a two-month supply 
of ammunition to provision eight mobile fighting groups.{20}
[50] 
 
Much to everyone's surprise, the Soviets donated nine of 
their own cargo planes to the relief effort. Moscow was just 
as alarmed as Washington by the massive influx of NVA into 
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pretext for committing its own forces to the conflict, 
undermining any possibility for détente. The Soviets had 
voiced these concerns to the North Vietnamese but they fell 
on deaf ears. In a "read my lips" gesture the Soviets shut 
down their air transport from Hanoi to Laos, compelling the 
North Vietnamese to move all supplies overland by truck 
convoy.  
[51] 
 
With so much aid going to the Neutralist army, Washington 
wanted assurances from Kong-Lê that he would not bite the 
hand feeding him. Jack Mathews was again called back from 
Africa to meet with Kong-Lê to ascertain his intentions. 
Mathews spent two weeks this time and secured the pledge his 
superiors wanted. As an added bonus, Mathews arranged a 
meeting between Kong-Lê and Vang Pao to see what might be 
done to get them working together. The two montagnard 
warriors had a grudging respect for each other. Kong-Lê 
assured Vang Pao he would continue the fight even if forced 
off the plain. Vang Pao pledged Kong-Lê sanctuary if that 
came to pass and demonstrated his sincerity by sending Hmong 
units to the southern edge of the plain as bait to draw the 
communists away from Neutralist forces.  
[52] 
 
Vang Pao's attempt at a rapprochement with Kong-Lê was not 
all bonhomie. He planned to augment Hmong troops with Khmu 
from Luang Prabang, Sayaboury, and Phong Saly where there 
were large concentrations of Khmu tribesmen. As Kong-Lê was 
the preeminent Khmu military and political figure in Laos, 
his goodwill was essential to the project.  
[53] 
 
The chicane was a success. Kong-Lê came to view the Hmong 
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to show greater respect for Hmong villagers and even 
executed one of his soldiers for stealing a cow from a Hmong 
peasant. As a special favor to Vang Pao and his CIA 
advisors, Kong-Lê delivered into their hands Somboun 
Chamtavong, a Khmu chieftain from the upper panhandle who 
had murdered two members of a PARU team and fled to Kong-Lê 
for protection. Vang Pao had Somboun shot and left to rot 
next to an airfield.{21}  
[54] 
 
Turning one of his own tribal leaders over for execution was 
strong testimony of Kong-Lê's newfound regard for Vang Pao. 
The message was not lost on Khmu in Sayaboury and Luang 
Prabang where PARU teams were beating the bush to recruit 
Khmu for Vang Pao's army. A month after the recruitment 
drive Vang Pao was able to add a second SGU battalion to his 
army; while the officers were all Hmong, over half of the 
troops were Khmu from Sayaboury and Luang Prabang.{22} In 
time, Khmu would come to constitute 22 percent of all of 
Vang Pao's battalion-size units.{23}  
 
 
The RLA Wins A Battle 
[55] 
 
True to his pledge, when the communists continued to hammer 
away at his army, Kong-Lê fought on, holed up in his new 
headquarters at Muong Soui just west of the plain, kept 
alive by truck convoys from Vientiane delivering food, fuel, 
arms, and ammunition. To cut this supply line, the 
communists overran Sala Phu Khun at the junction of Routes 
13 and 7, the link between the highway coming from Vientiane 
and the road leading to Muong Soui. The blocking force 
settled in for a long stay, determined to hold ground until 
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[56] 
 
In a rare moment, and with considerable pressure from U.S. 
ambassador Unger, the RLA general staff found some backbone 
and went after the communists with six regiments, attacking 
from three different directions. The toughest part was 
advancing over the thirty-mile stretch between Vang Vieng 
and Sala Phu Khun. For months the Pathet Lao had been 
investing the area with troops. The regiments plowed through 
the communists with relative ease, thanks to a simple scheme 
devised by an American intelligence officer. Each RLA 
forward unit carried a large wooden arrow, painted white. 
Once an advanced unit encountered resistance it laid down 
the arrow pointing in the direction of the enemy. Forward 
air controllers flying overhead called in Lao Air Force T-28 
bombers to saturate the designated area with heavy ordnance. 
[57] 
 
In total numbers the six regiments outmanned the Pathet 
Lao's three battalions at Sala Phu Khun by six to one; the 
RLA regiments also carried 105-mm and 75-mm howitzers. As 
the RLA force converged on the town, the Pathet Lao 
battalions measured their options and withdrew. At the last 
moment Vang Pao committed one of his SGUs to the campaign, 
delivering the mobile battalion to Sala Phu Khun by Air 
America helicopters. Since Sala Phu Khun was deserted, the 
Hmong were able to liberate the town without firing a shot. 
The Hmong waited to greet the RLA regiments. The Lao columns 
arrived the next day. Their commanders, finding only 
triumphant Hmong grinning from ear to ear, were 
uncontrollably "livid over the Hmong end run."{24}  
[58] 
 
The general staff back in Vientiane were elated, however. It 
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and several other top generals flew to the town to strut and 
celebrate. As rice whiskey flowed, the euphoria of the 
moment had the generals boasting that their next move would 
be to sweep the Pathet Lao and NVA from the Plain of Jars. 
They were brought back to reality when their troops reverted 
to form once they caught up with the fleeing Pathet Lao 
battalions near Muong Soui. Meeting stiff resistance they 
withdrew south, leaving Kong-Lê's beleaguered soldiers to 
fend for themselves. Within a few weeks, the Neutralists at 
Muong Soui were entirely encircled by NVA and a token force 
of Pathet Lao.{25}  
 
 
A Taste Of American Air Power 
[59] 
 
The U.S. protested the siege at the United Nations, charging 
the communists with attempting to eliminate through force 
the government created by the 1962 Geneva agreement. The 
diplomatic posturing was little help to Kong-Lê. What he 
needed was U.S. air strikes to dislodge the communists. 
Ambassador Unger was of the same mind. He made an urgent 
request to the Johnson administration to authorize air 
sorties over Muong Soui.  
[60] 
 
Shortly after taking office, Lyndon Johnson had confided to 
Henry Cabot Lodge: "I am not going to be the President who 
saw Southeast Asia go the way China went."{26} Unlike 
Kennedy, Johnson welcomed an escalation of the war, 
convinced that once the North Vietnamese experienced the 
military might of the U.S. they would negotiate a settlement 
that would leave them bottled up in the north.{27} Giving 
them a taste of American air power in Laos seemed a good 
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[61] 
 
To pinpoint enemy positions, twin-engine RF-101 Voodoo jets 
equipped with an assortment of aerial cameras flew 
reconnaissance. The communists were ready, having set up 
antiaircraft cannons at sixteen different sites on the 
plain. The rapid firing cannons, capable of 150 rounds per 
minute, brought down one of the jets. The two Air America 
helicopters sent to rescue the pilot also came under fire. 
Shrapnel seriously wounded some of their crew and the rescue 
was aborted. On the ground, Pathet Lao troops closed in on 
the downed Voodoo's pilot, Charles Klausmann, and took him 
prisoner. Another reconnaissance jet went down the next day. 
This time the pilot was rescued.{28}  
[62] 
 
In retaliation for the shootdowns, President Johnson ordered 
an air strike with eight F-100 Super Saber jets, the first 
use of American offensive air power in Laos. While the 
Sabers dropped their ordnance on antiaircraft batteries on 
the plain, the Lao air force launched its tiny armada of 
World War II vintage T-28s, A-26 light bombers, and hand-me-
down Navy A-1 Skyraiders. Carrying bombs recently supplied 
by the U.S., the propeller-driven planes hammered NVA and 
Pathet Lao units pressing in on Muong Soui.{29} The 
communists finally pulled back.  
 
 
The Ambassador's New Role 
[63] 
 
The communist offensive on the plain, and downed American 
aircraft, destroyed whatever was left of America's desire to 
Page 23 of 72 Hmong Studies Journal
4/26/2005 http://members.aol.com/hmongstudies/HSJv3_Quincy.htmlseek a political settlement in Laos. Washington gave Bill 
Lair the nod to renew support and training for the Hmong, 
but now on a much larger scale. The rest of the CIA 
organization also returned to Laos to resume operations, 
though under a new set of rules established earlier by 
President Kennedy.  
[64] 
 
The Bay of Pigs fiasco had embarrassed Kennedy and revealed 
the CIA at its most inept.{30} Nevertheless, Kennedy still 
valued the CIA, partly because he had an "almost obsessive 
interest in intelligence" and because he was a firm believer 
in undercover operations, especially counterinsurgency of 
the Green Beret variety. But the Bay of Pigs convinced him 
he would have to exercise greater control over the CIA to 
prevent new disasters in the future.{31}  
[65] 
 
In mid-1961, shortly after the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had 
reduced the agency's role in paramilitary operations in 
Laos, giving more responsibility to the White Star teams for 
training and support.{32} To guard against renegade 
operations in the future, Kennedy placed the CIA under the 
authority of U.S. Ambassador, Leonard Unger. This was part 
of a larger shake-up in the state department. Kennedy wanted 
American ambassadors across the globe to take greater 
responsibility for all U.S. activities on foreign soil, 
particularly covert operations. On May 29th, 1961, every 
ambassador received a letter from the President outlining 
these new responsibilities, which included supervision and 
control of all U.S. agencies in-country, and even military 
forces if an American commander was not on the scene.{33}  
[66] 
 
Applied to Laos, the new policy was an attempt to prevent 
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paths, as they had in the months following Kong-Lê's coup.
{34} The new policy not only gave Ambassador Unger oversight 
of all CIA activities, it soon placed him in charge of all 
U.S. military operations in the country, for after the 1962 
Geneva accords there was no longer a U.S. military command 
in Laos. The military assistance program (MAAG/Laos) had 
moved to Thailand to become submerged in MAAG/Thailand as 
DEPCHIEF{35} in order to maintain the pretense of no direct 
U.S. military action in Laos. The cosmetic move gave Unger, 
as well as the two Ambassadors who would follow him, 
complete authority over all military and paramilitary 
operations in the country, making them the equivalent of a 
Roman proconsul, a combination of state administrator and 
military field marshal.  
[67] 
 
To manage this new responsibility, Unger established the 
Requirements Office (RO). Masquerading as a part of the 
United States Aid Mission, the RO was where decisions on 
military operations in Laos were made by Unger in 
consultation with the CIA section chief and several military 
attaches. General Reuben Tucker, who commanded DEPCHIEF in 
Thailand, was never consulted. Left out of policy making, 
his only role was that of a glorified warrant officer. His 
job was to insure that the arms, personnel, and supplies 
requested by Unger reached Laos.{36} To facilitate this 
task, Tucker supervised a 380-acre munitions storage 
facility near Udorn air base, plus an Air America facility 
at Udorn, port facilities in the Gulf of Thailand, and a 
large warehouse at Bangkok's Don Muang Airport.  
[68] 
 
While this placed enormous resources at Unger's fingertips, 
it was only after Washington gave up on neutralism that he 
had the green light to tap them. By then Unger's tour of 
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Sullivan, would keep General Tucker busy around-the-clock 
providing the logistics for Vang Pao's expanding guerrilla 
army.  
 
 
Phoumi's Last Coup 
[69] 
 
1964 was a good year for the communists. They controlled the 
Plain of Jars, had Kong-Lê bottled up at Muong Soui, and had 
retaken most of the Sam Neua territory lost to Vang Pao in 
mid-1963. This should have been cause for concern at RLA 
headquarters in Vientiane, but the top generals were too 
busy fighting each other to worry about the enemy.  
[70] 
 
In August Phoumi attempted a coup. Kouprasith Abhay 
mobilized his forces and nipped it in the bud. Five months 
later Phoumi was at it again, this time with the complicity 
of Colonel Khamkhong Bouddavong, commander of MR II. Abhay 
requested help from General Siho to suppress the coup 
attempt, asking that he commit his police battalions to save 
the capital. Siho sat on his hands and did nothing. It was a 
bad move.  
[71] 
 
Abhay raised an entire regiment, secured air support, and 
went after all three: Phoumi, Khamkhong, and Siho. The 
national police headquarters outside of Vientiane was soon a 
burning inferno, blown apart and set ablaze by 155-mm 
howitzers. Fighter planes bombed and strafed Siho's best 
battalions billeted twelve miles north of Vientiane. 
Khamkhong's troops caved in and surrendered, as did 
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to Thailand. Khamkhong wound up in jail, leaving MR II 
without a commander.{37}  
 
 
William Sullivan 
[72] 
 
In January 1965, nearly three years after Phoumi first 
offered him the position, Vang Pao was again asked to take 
command of the second military region. This time the offer 
came from the prime minister, though the decision was 
probably not Souvanna Phouma's alone. William Sullivan, the 
new U.S. ambassador, was committed to a clandestine war and 
believed a guerrilla army could defeat the NVA. Believing 
Vang Pao to be a military genius in matters of guerrilla 
warfare, he wanted him in charge of the "real" fighting.  
[73] 
 
Sullivan had been part of the American delegation at Geneva 
and helped draft the final document, which prohibited 
foreign troops from operating on Laotian soil. Since the 
Geneva agreement carried the imprint of his diplomatic 
skill, Sullivan had a personal stake in making it work, or 
at least appear to work. Above all else he wanted to 
camouflage the true extent of America's illegal involvement 
in the conflict. A large military mission and arms 
assistance program like MAAG/Laos was too conspicuous.  
[74] 
 
Sullivan approved of the earlier decision to move MAAG/Laos 
out of Laos and hide it inside MAAG/Thailand. He wanted the 
war in Laos to be invisible to the outside world. Using the 
Viet Cong as his model, he intended to "borrow from the 
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clandestine, deniable system of paramilitary assistance, 
with any actual fighting being done by indigenous forces . . 
. drawn from the Hmong tribes." Not only was a guerrilla 
army easy to conceal, Sullivan was convinced it was the only 
fighting force capable of thwarting a North Vietnamese 
victory in Laos.  
[75] 
 
Two years earlier Sullivan had participated in a 
controversial war game organized by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to determine the advisability of committing American 
troops to Vietnam. The generals were divided. Those from the 
U.S. Air Force believed superior air power could neutralize 
communist forces and hamper their supply lines, making it 
impossible for them to maintain an effective army in the 
field. Generals from the other services were less confident. 
To settle the matter, the joint chiefs took part in a war 
game, with the rules drawn up by the Rand Corporation, a 
think tank under contract to the defense department.  
[76] 
 
Sullivan played on the communist team in the role of General 
Giap. The simulated war covered ten years, with the 
communists employing traditional guerrilla tactics against 
the American team's superior weapons and technology. The 
game ran for a week. At the conclusion, which in game time 
was the year 1972, communist forces were all over the map of 
Indochina, covering most of Vietnam and occupying large 
portions of Laos and Cambodia. American troop strength was 
at 500,000 with no end of the war in sight. Equally 
disturbing was the domestic politics component of the game. 
Ten years of fighting had only increased the solidarity of 
the North Vietnamese while American voters were deeply 
divided; there were antiwar protests on university campuses; 
congress was on the brink of revolt against the President.  
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A few days into the game, still playing the role of Giap, 
Sullivan launched a guerrilla raid against Bien Hoa Airfield 
in South Vietnam and, on paper at least, destroyed a large 
number of American aircraft. The year according to the 
game's clock was 1964. Sullivan happened to be at Bien Houa 
in November of 1964 when real communist guerrillas assaulted 
the airfield. Right on schedule they blew up fuel storage 
sites, ammunition dumps, and several planes.  
[78] 
 
The war game made Sullivan a believer. Guerrilla tactics 
worked. But it was all theory until the Viet Cong assault on 
Bien Houa. Suddenly Sullivan understood at gut level that 
guerrilla action was an effective way to defeat a superior 
force, something America's military planners had yet to 
appreciate. Applied to Laos, Sullivan was convinced that 
supporting Vang Pao offered a unique opportunity to turn the 
tables on the North Vietnamese. The Hmong would become 
America's Viet Cong, an indigenous guerrilla force that 
harassed and bled a militarily superior enemy, frustrating 
him at every turn. As ambassador, Sullivan intended to 
acknowledge Vang Pao's Hmong army as the centerpiece of 
Laos' response to the invading North Vietnamese. Kennedy's 
earlier state department policy changes gave him the 
authority to do so. And Sullivan's standing in Washington 
gave him the clout to use that authority as he saw fit.  
[79] 
 
Sullivan had earlier served as chairman of President 
Johnson's "Vietnam Working Group," a special committee 
charged with developing strategy for conducting the Vietnam 
War. It confirmed his reputation as a major player in the 
Johnson administration and made him a favorite of the 
president. After Sullivan became ambassador, every six 
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look at briefing maps, give Sullivan a pat on the back, and 
press more money on him to carry out the war in his own way. 
As Sullivan remembers, "once this was in the form of a snap 
decision on his part to give me $75 million that neither I 
nor the Department of State had asked for."{38} Sullivan 
could run the war any way he wanted.  
[80] 
 
In retrospect, Sullivan's ambassadorship was the last in a 
chain of events that made Vang Pao the focus of America's 
response to communist aggression in Laos. It began with Bill 
Lair's ambition for a role in Laos for PARU, followed by the 
CIA's decision to involve PARU teams in Phoumi's assault on 
Vientiane, placing Lair and his PARU in Laos where they 
could make contact with Vang Pao. Lair had barely begun to 
formulate his ideas for a PARU-trained Hmong guerrilla force 
when Desmond FitzGerald, chief of covert actions for Asia, 
arrived in Vientiane looking for a new direction for the 
agency in Laos. Once Lair told FitzGerald about Vang Pao, 
Operation Momentum was born, then given an unexpected boost 
by the Geneva accords which forbade an overt U.S. military 
presence in Laos, making covert operations all the more 
attractive. With Sullivan as ambassador, the last piece was 
in place.  
 
 
Vinton Lawrence's Nation-Building Campaign 
[81] 
 
As commander of MR II, Vang Pao had plans to double his army 
from seven to fifteen thousand troops and to organize the 
bulk into SGUs: battalion-size units of five hundred 
soldiers divided into a headquarters unit and three line 
companies armed with 60-mm mortars, 57-mm recoilless 
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designed to pack a punch and yet remain highly mobile so 
they could be inserted or extracted at a moment's notice by 
helicopters or light transport aircraft. Two SGUs were 
already in operation; four more were in embryonic form. Vang 
Pao envisaged a dozen SGUs forming the core of his guerrilla 
army.  
[82] 
 
The larger units were needed because of the changing nature 
of the war. Vang Pao's troops had routed the Pathet Lao in 
nearly every encounter, forcing them by degrees to retire 
from the serious fighting and allow the North Vietnamese to 
take their place, turning the war into a contest between 
Hmong guerrillas and the NVA. At this early stage Vang Pao 
still imagined that victory was possible, if he could only 
recruit enough Hmong for the fighting, organize them into 
air-mobile battalions, and equip his troops with modern 
weapons.  
[83] 
 
Recruiting more Hmong was not a simple proposition. Vang Pao 
may have rejoiced at America's decision to shift support 
from the regular RLA to his own army, but for ordinary Hmong 
on the sidelines it was a dubious honor. If the Lao ran away 
from the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese, why should the 
Hmong do their fighting and defend a nation that treated 
them as inferiors? More than a few Hmong could still recall, 
prior to Touby's rise to power, how they had to kowtow to 
ethnic Lao, crawling on all fours to the desk of a petty Lao 
bureaucrat to gain an audience. Such memories were not 
conducive to blind patriotism.  
[84] 
 
CIA agents working closely with Vang Pao understood the 
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the start of Momentum and had stayed on at Long Cheng when 
the rest of the CIA pulled out as required by the Geneva 
accords. Only twenty-one, Lawrence was the youngest agent in 
the field, having signed on with the CIA right after 
graduating from Princeton. Despite his youth, or perhaps 
because of his education, Lawrence was prone to reflection. 
[85] 
 
During his first few months in Laos Lawrence worked for Lair 
in Vientiane at "Meo Alley," the compound the CIA had set 
aside for Lair's headquarters. It was a break-in period 
allowing Lawrence time to acclimatize. Lawrence knew nothing 
about the Hmong and his ignorance troubled him. At nights he 
went out drinking with the older agents, constantly probing 
them with questions about the Hmong, wanting to know about 
their history and culture and how best to deal with them. 
Lawrence took this same inquisitive spirit into the field, 
keeping his eyes open to pick up anything and everything 
that would give him a better understanding of the mysterious 
mountain people he would soon be advising on matters that 
could affect their very survival.{40}  
[86] 
 
After working closely with the Hmong for a year, Lawrence 
felt he had some grasp of their strengths and weaknesses. He 
concluded that changing Hmong politics was even more 
important than training and equipping them to fight a war. 
The Hmong were hopelessly parochial. The center of their 
universe was family and village and they felt no call to 
leave home to fight far away, even to defend fellow Hmong. 
To fight in distant places for something as abstract as a 
free Laos made no sense to them at all. The Hmong needed a 
sense of themselves as one people and a vision of Laos as 
their motherland.  
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Lawrence got the CIA to build a house at Long Cheng for the 
provincial governor, Sai Kham, and persuaded him to move in 
(which wasn't difficult since the provincial capital was in 
communist hands) so the Hmong could make contact with a top 
Lao bureaucrat and identify with him as a leader of both the 
Hmong and Lao. Even more important to Lawrence's thinking 
was building a residence for Savang Vatthana, so the king 
could make periodic visits for the laying-on of hands to 
consecrate the Hmong war as a national crusade.  
[88] 
 
The king did show up in late 1963 to red carpets and Hmong 
children waving Laotian flags; Savang Vatthana affirmed the 
Hmong were bona fide Laotian citizens and that he was their 
king and that Laos appreciated the sacrifice they were 
making for the nation. Lawrence believed the visit had 
provided Vang Pao "a cachet, that he had been recognized; 
that his people had been recognized and appreciated." Even 
Bill Lair, who helped organize the visit, was satisfied that 
the "Hmong were on their way to being successfully 
assimilated into the larger Laotian scene."{41}  
[89] 
 
Lair's enthusiasm persuaded Lawrence to move ahead with his 
"nation-building" program and establish a radio station at 
Long Cheng, which he named the Union of Lao Races radio 
station. Broadcasting daily in Hmong, Lao, and Khmu, the 
station promoted the idea that the mountain minorities were 
all Lao citizens who had to unite together to defend Laos 
against communist aggression. Lawrence considered the radio 
station the crowning achievement of his nation-building 
campaign.{42}  
[90] 
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To help Lawrence's nation-building, USAID took Hmong village 
leaders to Vientiane and Luang Prabang, guided tours to 
expose them to the mainstream of Lao society so that it 
would no longer seem alien. USAID also constructed a road 
from Route 13 to Long Cheng to integrate Hmong into the 
national economy and increase the contact between Hmong and 
Lao. As one USAID official put it: "There was this constant 
effort to try to tell them that they were part of one 
country." However, the same official also conceded that 
"whether they believed it or not or understood it, I make no 
pretense of even guessing."{43}  
[91] 
 
Testimony from Hmong interviews suggests that the effort had 
little effect on the vast majority of ordinary Hmong.{44} 
They were far from being assimilated, nor did they ever 
develop anything approaching a firm allegiance to the Lao 
state. The king's visit had done more to legitimize Vang Pao 
to the Lao elite (though only barely) than to legitimize the 
Lao state to the Hmong.  
[92] 
 
Vang Pao knew the Hmong felt little allegiance to Vientiane, 
that Vinton Lawrence had tried to change Hmong politics and 
failed. If Hmong politics could not be changed, then it 
would have to be manipulated to support the war effort. This 
would not be easy. In the absence of messianic leadership 
(and Vang Pao did not qualify), cooperation among Hmong on a 
large scale for any purpose or ideal did not come easily. 
Divided by narrow allegiances to tribe and clan, Hmong were 
more prone to dissension than concord.  
[93] 
 
There were three Hmong tribes in Laos (Green, White, and 
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dialect. In the larger villages, families tended to cluster 
by tribe, spoke to each other in their own dialect, honored 
tribal dress, and shared religious rituals that set them 
apart from their neighbors.{45} Though this divided Hmong 
from each other, it was a far cry from the daggers-drawn 
diffidence that existed between Hmong tribes in China.{46} 
Still, there was sufficient tribal bigotry in Laos to poison 
the wellspring of goodwill, making cooperation, even for 
mutual benefit, tenuous.  
[94] 
 
Living in primitive conditions in Sam Neua and Phong Saly in 
isolated villages on remote mountains, the Striped Hmong 
were stereotyped by Green and White Hmong as country 
bumpkins and made the butt of jokes: hardly the sort of 
thing to inspire ethnic solidarity. Between 1964 and 1966 
when NVA units occupied Laos' far north, thousands of 
Striped Hmong sought sanctuary in Xieng Khouang Province, 
the hub of the Hmong war effort and White Hmong territory. 
Despite receiving sanctuary, the refugees refused to 
contribute soldiers to fight the Vietnamese or gather 
intelligence on enemy troop movements. Resentment for White 
Hmong bigotry crowded out the larger issue of race 
solidarity and the goal of reclaiming their homeland.  
[95] 
 
Clan loyalty also caused problems. There were eighteen Hmong 
clans in Laos.{47} Each clan had its own customs associated 
with birth, marriage, and death that set it apart from the 
others. More important, obligations for mutual aid were 
clan-based. A Hmong turned first to his or her immediate 
family, then to close clan relations, and finally to distant 
clan cousins for support when in need, for each clan was 
expected to take care of its own. It was a convention that 
encouraged Hmong to live in close proximity to fellow 
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those from different clans. The effect was to narrow 
allegiances.{48}  
[96] 
 
For this reason, except for Pa Chay's messianic movement, 
Hmong politics in Laos had always been clan-based. To be 
successful a Hmong politician had to first build a power 
base within his own clan, then forge alliances with leaders 
of other clans to establish broad governance which, at least 
on the surface, purported to represent the Hmong qua Hmong 
rather than merely the interests of, say, the Ly or Lo clan. 
Only Touby had pulled this off, and only because he 
controlled the Hmong opium market that delivered spoils to 
reward supporters and buy off challengers. If Vang Pao meant 
to match Touby's achievement, he would have to develop his 
own source of spoils and on a much larger scale than even 
Touby had imagined possible.  
 
 
Machine Politics Hmong-Style 
[97] 
 
MR II encompassed Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua, two provinces 
populated mainly by montagnards, primarily Hmong, Khmu, and 
highland T'ai. One condition Vang Pao attached to accepting 
command of the military region was that he be granted 
complete authority over the ethnic minorities.{49} Souvanna 
Phouma did not object. It transformed Vang Pao into a 
virtual warlord.  
[98] 
 
Vang Pao used his new authority to create an independent 
political administration for Xieng Khouang{50} that would 
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tassengs, dozens of nai kongs, and five chao muongs, plus 
hundreds of minor bureaucrats serving as staff for tassengs, 
nai kongs, and chao muongs.{51} There were also positions on 
advisory councils attached to chao muongs, groups of clan 
elders who drew a salary like all the rest. There was a 
civic administration that included school administrators, 
public health officials, various advisory boards, and an 
extensive police force.  
[99] 
 
Vang Pao did not have the authority to abolish the old Lao 
provincial bureaucracy. These officials continued to draw 
salaries from Vientiane, though they no longer exercised 
real power. In time they would cease maintaining offices and 
entirely withdraw from the affairs of the province, so 
completely receding into the background that most Hmong 
presumed the old bureaucracy had been dismantled and 
replaced by Vang Pao's vast system of spoils.  
[100] 
 
To forge alliances with clan chieftains, Vang Pao appointed 
representatives of the most powerful clans to the top posts 
in his administration (chao muong, nai kong, tasseng, and 
nai ban). As the Ly clan was the most powerful, Ly notables 
received many of the highest offices, which was only good 
politics. Vang clansmen were also rewarded, and out of 
proportion to their place in the clan hierarchy. This was 
bad politics, though by past standards the level of 
favoritism was not extreme. Only toward the end of the war, 
when things were going badly in the field and leaders of 
various clans maneuvered to bring him down, did Vang Pao 
overload his bureaucracy with Vang.  
[101] 
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substantial salaries. Eventually, they would grow to become 
ten times higher than those received by "official" 
provincial authorities. By the late 1960s chao muongs drew a 
salary of a hundred thousand kip per month (about four 
hundred dollars), distributed by Vang Pao at the close of 
his monthly meeting with all top political appointees. And 
there were fringe benefits. In 1969 Vang Pao honored five 
chao muongs drawn from the Ly, Moua, Thao, and Yang clans 
with brand new jeeps, each vehicle painted white to set it 
apart from the models used by ordinary soldiers.  
[102] 
 
Over the years Vang Pao created additional posts, well-paid 
sinecures with no real duties, to buy off potential rivals 
and disgruntled political allies. He also used his influence 
with the CIA and American embassy to wangle positions for 
Hmong in the national ministries, from low-level 
bureaucratic posts to top positions in the Ministry of 
Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and 
Ministry of Justice.  
[103] 
 
To reach beyond clan leaders to the rank and file, Vang Pao 
distributed an array of benefits to ordinary Hmong who 
supported his cause. With the CIA's deep pockets he was able 
to pay volunteers for full-time military service much higher 
salaries than that received by regular soldiers in the RLA, 
eventually ten times more. The highest pay went to Hmong 
pilots, ordinary Hmong who joined Vang Pao's tiny air force, 
begun in 1968. Going from rags to riches, some of these 
pilots earned more than Xieng Khouang's top civil servants, 
which apart from their derring-do in the skies transformed 
them into cultural heroes for Hmong peasants secretly 
resentful of the unearned privileges of clan aristocrats.  
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For thousands of poor Hmong peasants earning less than 
lowland rice farmers, soldiering for Vang Pao was a way to 
abandon a life of grinding poverty for one of relative 
affluence. During much of the war (before mid-1968) this 
inducement alone was sufficient to guarantee an adequate 
supply of recruits, especially as income from military chits 
came to be treated as appanage. Eldest sons had the right to 
take the place of wounded or killed fathers to keep the 
family on the military dole. In time this would extend to 
the greening buds of the family tree as young teenagers 
replaced their dead elder brothers, creating platoons of 
Lilliputian soldiers in baggy uniforms with sleeves rolled 
up to the elbows to free tiny hands for the operation of 
man-size weapons.  
[105] 
 
For Hmong in the ADCs, family dependence on military pay was 
not a life and death matter. Soldiers were headquartered in 
their home village where the family had a farm to fall back 
on. But the SGUs were at Long Cheng, and Vang Pao encouraged 
the soldiers in these battalions to relocate their families 
near the military base. Without a farm to work, military pay 
was the only thing that kept these families going, which was 
an additional reason Vang Pao wanted to reorganize his 
entire army into SGU battalions; it increased his control. 
As CIA agent Vinton Lawrence put it, "When the families come 
to Long Cheng, in effect they are hostage to Vang Pao. And 
Vang Pao knows that. That helps him control the troops."{52}
[106] 
 
There were also communal incentives for backing the war 
effort. Money, rice, and weapons went to every Hmong village 
that contributed soldiers to the cause. This support was 
sometimes offered in terms villagers found difficult to 
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be considered pro Pathet Lao, with the implication that the 
village might be subjected to attack.{53} In 1971 Hmong 
villagers at Long Pot held fast to their commitment to stay 
out of the war and refused to support Vang Pao. Long Pot was 
bombed by T-28s and American jets stationed in Thailand.{54}
[107] 
 
Large salaries for soldiers and politicians, bribes to 
village chieftains, and food and supplies for villages 
willing to support the war effort, required a great deal of 
money. Vang Pao had the power to tax but never used it. 
Taxes, largely unofficial, had become burdensome in the last 
years of Touby's reign. Hmong were paying household taxes, 
fees for marriage certificates, and sales taxes. Some Hmong 
officials brazenly appropriated cattle, horses, silver, and 
opium simply because they had the power to do so. Others 
solicited bribes to influence legal and administrative 
decisions. Preoccupied with national politics, Touby did 
nothing to stop his local appointees from fleecing Hmong 
communities across the province.  
[108] 
 
Vang Pao had watched the corruption erode Touby's once 
impregnable power base and vowed never to make the same 
mistake. As commander of MR II he would repeatedly proclaim 
he was a soldier and not a politician and therefore above 
politics and corruption. It was hyperbole. Over the years 
Vang Pao would cheat, lie, order assassinations, and fiddle 
with the public purse. But one thing he did not do was take 
from the common man. For years this was enough to save him 
from the taint of corruption, at least in the eyes of 
ordinary Hmong.  
[109] 
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first administrative acts was to abolish all taxes, official 
and unofficial. It was a popular move, but left him without 
a source of public revenue. He made up for the loss from 
other areas. One was soldiers' pay. For much of the war Vang 
Pao personally delivered soldiers' pay to unit commanders in 
the field. With each soldier receiving 8,000 kip per month, 
plus an additional 200 kip per day for combat duty,{55} the 
total monthly allotment for all of his troops occasionally 
topped 250 million kip (approximately $1 million). Acting as 
his own paymaster, it was easy for Vang Pao to skim money, 
which he did from two ends.  
[110] 
 
In Thailand Vang Pao's agents converted soldiers' pay, 
denominated in American dollars, into Thai dollars (baht). 
In Laos they converted the baht to kip. Thousands of dollars 
were skimmed during both money exchanges and delivered to 
Vang Pao, minus what his agents set aside for themselves. 
Vang Pao's brother-in-law, Pa Chay Thao, was his principal 
agent for the currency exchanges. By the early 1970s, Pa 
Chay Thao owned two airplanes, several houses, and extensive 
property in Thailand.{56}  
[111] 
 
A transport plane delivered the kip left over from the money 
exchanges, several tons worth, to Long Cheng where Vang Pao 
took possession and distributed it to troops in the field.
{57} The U.S. funded his battalions at full strength, but 
Vang Pao often kept them staffed far below the required 550, 
usually by retaining dead soldiers on the pay rosters. A 
1970 government audit found that five of his battalions were 
understaffed by nearly fifteen hundred men. Pay for these 
dead soldiers netted Vang Pao nearly fifty thousand dollars 
per month.  
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And there was money from various businesses. After 1965 the 
secret war created tens of thousands of refugees yearly who 
swarmed into the villages and settlements around Long Cheng 
for security and to receive aid. The refugees created an 
expanding consumer market for goods of all kinds. In time 
there would be more than a hundred thousand Hmong in the 
area, making Long Cheng the second largest city in Laos. 
There were also Khmu and Lao refugees, forty thousand of 
them mixed in with the Hmong. The population growth 
transformed the once sleepy villages of Ban Some, Sam Thong, 
Phak Khet, Pha Khao, Muong Cha, and Ban Houakham into 
bustling centers of commerce fueled by soldiers' pay and a 
healthy black market in goods distributed to Hmong by USAID. 
[113] 
 
Vang Pao's airline, Xieng Khouang Air Transport, delivered 
hundreds of tons of merchandise to villages throughout the 
region every month. Vang Pao was a major retailer of these 
goods, employing a staff of Hmong salesmen to peddle items 
door-to-door in the larger villages.{58} He was also into 
banking, handling deposits and money exchanges at the Long 
Cheng Bank, the only Hmong-owned financial institution in 
Laos.  
[114] 
 
And then there were narcotics. Vang Pao had mixed feelings 
about opium. He preached against the evils of addiction, but 
was pragmatic with addicts; occasionally he airdropped opium 
to troops in the field so addicted soldiers involved in a 
prolonged campaign would not suffer withdrawal and impede 
the effectiveness of their unit.{59} Nor did he have any 
reservations about trafficking in the drug if it advanced 
his ends.  
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Vang Pao first became involved in the opium trade in 1963. 
Desperate for more soldiers but strapped for the cash to add 
them to his pay roster, he used military helicopters to 
collect opium from mountain villages and delivered the 
narcotics to merchants in central Vietnam where opium 
fetched top dollar. Most of the money from the sales went 
for soldiers' salaries, though Tony Poe later claimed Vang 
Pao grew rich from narcotics trafficking.{60}  
[116] 
 
Vang Pao greatly expanded his involvement in narcotics once 
the war heated up after 1965. The intense fighting kept 
opium merchants out of the highlands. In village after 
village, opium harvests moldered in sheds instead of 
reaching the market. Rather than let the fruit of their 
labor rot in burlap sacks, Hmong farmers in communist-held 
territory north of the Plain of Jars began selling their 
harvest to the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese.{61} Profits 
from these deals purchased weapons to kill Hmong soldiers. 
To deny the opium to the communists and to reap the profits 
for himself, Vang Pao arranged for the CIA to begin 
transporting opium from the highlands to Vientiane, Saigon, 
and Bangkok.  
[117] 
 
To undermine Vang Pao's narcotics operation, Moscow sent 
Hanoi fifteen tons of silver, plus 3.5 million feet of 
black, green, and red cloth much prized by the Hmong, to 
trade for Hmong opium before Vang Pao could get his hands on 
it. The plan might have worked had the North Vietnamese not 
botched the operation. To be negotiable the silver had to be 
recast into ingots the size of candy bars used by the Hmong 
in business transactions. The task seemed beyond Hanoi's 
ability and very little of the silver entered the Hmong 
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[118] 
 
With no serious economic competition from the communists, 
Vang Pao was able to expand his opium collection network to 
accommodate nearly all of the Hmong opium grown in Laos, 
much of it transported by his own private airline, Xieng 
Khouang Air Transport, launched in 1967 and subsidized with 
CIA funds.{63} Thousands of Hmong villages in opium growing 
areas became dependent on him for their cash income, an 
economic fact of life that made them reluctant to deny his 
requests for military volunteers to flesh out his growing 
army.  
[119] 
 
The money from narcotics, skimmed soldiers' pay, and various 
business enterprises went mostly to subsidize the political 
patronage that guaranteed the fidelity of clan leaders. To 
purchase the loyalty of ordinary Hmong, Vang Pao used 
refugee relief. At its height, refugee aid funded by the 
U.S. created jobs, provided services, and distributed food 
and clothing to more than half of the Hmong in Laos. The 
principal force behind refugee aid was USAID. With CIA funds 
the organization established schools, delivered food, 
clothing, medicine, and created agricultural projects for 
Hmong displaced by the war.  
[120] 
 
Nearly every village of any size supporting the war effort 
had a school of some kind. In the early 1960s, on his own 
initiative Edgar Buell had initiated a village school 
movement with supplies donated by the United States 
Information Agency and the CIA. Buell would later boast that 
eighty thousand Hmong children attended his village schools.
{64} This was an exaggeration. The real growth in school 
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lumber, cement, and tin sheeting to Hmong communities so 
villagers could erect their own schoolhouses. USAID donated 
blackboards and chalk, books and school supplies, and 
trained Hmong to be teachers.  
[121] 
 
The textbooks for the elementary schools were adapted from 
those used by the Pathet Lao in their own education 
programs‹books modeled after those used by Hanoi to 
assimilate ethnic minorities in North Vietnam into the 
dominant Vietnamese culture and to make them good 
communists.{65} The Pathet Lao's school books interspersed 
lessons on useful skills, mainly farming, with short tracts 
on national history with a Marxist slant, which USAID 
modified to build rather than tear down allegiance to the 
Royal Laotian Government.  
[122] 
 
By the end of 1969, 50 percent of all Hmong school-age 
children in the sixty-mile refugee corridor south of the 
Plain of Jars were enrolled in school. An additional three 
hundred Hmong were at the French high school in Vientiane 
and thirty-seven were studying abroad. Across Xieng Khouang 
Province there were three hundred elementary schools, nine 
junior high schools, and two high schools.{66} The largest 
elementary school was at Sam Thong, with seven thousand 
students. There was also a high school at Sam Thong, 
teaching grades seven through ten, and a teacher's college. 
The college was Vang Pao's idea. Too many Hmong were going 
to Vientiane for teacher training, slipping from his 
influence and control.  
[123] 
 
Another service provided by USAID was medical care. Charles 
Page 45 of 72 Hmong Studies Journal
4/26/2005 http://members.aol.com/hmongstudies/HSJv3_Quincy.htmlWeldon, a physician with USAID, directed a program to 
establish medical dispensaries in Hmong villages and train 
Hmong as medics and nurses. Weldon eventually expanded the 
crude hospital created by Edgar Buell at Sam Thong into a 
hundred-bed modern facility, staffed by American physicians 
on contract with USAID. Within a few years there was another 
modern hospital at Long Cheng staffed by Thai physicians.`  
[124] 
 
All refugees received food, cooking oil, clothing, pots and 
pans, and medicine (much of donated by U.S. drug firms 
because it had past its expiration date and could no longer 
be marketed in the U.S.),{67} but only villages solidly 
behind the war effort became sites for warehouses where 
these items were stored prior to distribution. Hmong living 
in these villages had jobs loading and unloading supplies 
and driving the trucks that delivered goods to refugees. And 
they could pilfer. This was expected and tolerated, if 
undertaken in moderation. The pilfering sustained a healthy 
black market with a reach that extended into the lowlands 
where food and clothing were not free.  
[125] 
 
Favored villages got tractors to help with the clearing of 
land, a welcome gift for swidden farmers like the Hmong who 
established their plots by clearing virgin forest‹back-
breaking work felling trees by hand, clearing away bushes 
with machetes, then gathering it all up into piles for 
burning so the ashes could be spread to fertilize the soil. 
It took a month of hard labor to clear and burn just a 
couple of acres. With a tractor it was finished in a few 
days. The tractors made Vang Pao a very popular man.{68}  
[126] 
 
Many of these same villages became sites for USAID 
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pig farms, poultry farms, and cattle ranches. USAID supplied 
all the livestock, including the fish (fast-growing Tilapia 
from Thailand) for the fish farms. The agency delivered 
truckloads of pigs, cattle, and chickens. USAID volunteers 
helped Hmong form pig cooperatives and taught them how to 
run a modern poultry farm, complete with incubators. USAID 
brought in bulldozers to gouge out swales for fish ponds and 
delivered building material for chicken coups and pig sheds. 
Of all these enterprises cattle ranching was the most 
prestigious. Vang Pao personally purchased thousands of head 
of cattle from Thailand for distribution to his political 
and military cronies to set them up as cattle barons.  
[127] 
 
Vang Pao's administration was not all graft and patronage. 
He also tried to tame the clans by schooling them in 
cooperation, organizing various political councils with 
members drawn from the different clans. The most prestigious 
of these bodies was the Hmong Council of Elders, filled with 
the most respected clan chieftains in the province. All 
councils were purely advisory, organized to accustom the 
clans to working together, though Vang Pao also used them to 
check the pulse of Hmong public opinion and to lend a sense 
of unanimous support to his own political decisions.  
[128] 
 
One can only wonder what Vinton Lawrence made of all of 
this. He left Laos in early 1966, promoted stateside by 
William Colby. The CIA's Far East Chief wanted the bright 
young agent back at CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia as 
his own special assistant.{69} Sitting in an office at CIA 
headquarters reflecting on his two tours in Laos, did 
Lawrence still imagine that Vang Pao was nation-building, 
rather than simply spawning a political machine to guarantee 
recruits and generate support for his army?  
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Certainly Pa Chay would have found all the money laundering, 
skimmed payrolls, business deals, patronage, bribes, graft, 
and manipulation of public opinion incomprehensible, but it 
was the kind of politics that old-fashioned political bosses 
in America (men like William Tweed of New York's Tammany 
Hall, Thomas Pendergast of the old Kansas City political 
machine, and more recently Chicago's Richard J. Daley) would 
have understood and admired‹especially as Vang Pao could do 
things they could only do in their dreams, like accumulate 
wives for political ends and assassinate rivals.  
[130] 
 
Vang Pao's first marriage was to a strikingly beautiful 
woman from the Lo clan. She died young, leaving behind three 
children. Vang Pao married again for love, this time to a 
woman from the Thao clan. She gave him more children but 
favored them over those from his first marriage. Concerned 
for the children's welfare, Vang Pao married his first 
wife's sister, May Lo, knowing she would give them the love 
they deserved. The rest of his marriages were political, an 
effort to forge family links to powerful clan leaders or as 
goodwill gestures to the disaffected.  
[131] 
 
He married True Ly to create blood ties directly to Touby 
LyFoung,{70} then wed Chia Moua to gain the allegiance of 
her father Cher Pao Moua, the warlord of Bouam Long, a 
strategic stronghold north of the Plain of Jars. Vang Pao 
took his next wife from Sam Neua to form better relations 
with the Striped Hmong,{71} and his seventh from Tase, a 
Moua enclave that had previously shunned his leadership.{72}
His eighth wife was a Lao woman, a concession to the ethnic 
Lao who nearly equaled the number of Hmong in the province.
{73} His ninth and last wife was Zong Moua, the daughter of 
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made it his headquarters. With refugees spilling into Long 
Cheng and occupying land reserved for Moua clansmen, 
relations with Moua villagers became strained. The marriage 
was to cool tempers, as was Vang Pao's decision to elevate 
Cher Chou Moua to the head of the prestigious Hmong Council 
that administered Long Cheng's civil affairs and arbitrated 
inter-clan disputes.{74}  
[132] 
 
Not only did Vang Pao marry for power, if necessary he 
assassinated rivals and troublemakers to preserve it. Vang 
Pao first tried his hand at assassination in 1959 when he 
ordered an attack on the RLA provincial commander Colonel 
Khambou Boussarath. Vang Pao was also probably behind the 
1963 murder of Major Sao Ly, the Hmong officer being groomed 
by Bill Lair as Vang Pao's understudy. How many others he 
ordered killed is impossible to document, though one Hmong 
in his inner circle believed there may have been dozens; 
hardly a reign of terror but substantial nevertheless. Not 
all of the assassinations went off without a hitch. One had 
serious repercussions that eroded Vang Pao's power base.  
[133] 
 
For troops garrisoned in the field, military organization 
mirrored Vang Pao's political administration. Whenever 
feasible, Vang Pao gave local clan chieftains command. This 
disposed nearby villages to gather intelligence and feed 
soldiers. This also co-opted the chieftains into Vang Pao's 
network of graft and payoff, for commanders were expected to 
hold back part of their troops' pay for themselves.  
[134] 
 
The system had its defects. Clan notables were not always 
competent military leaders and occasionally reached too far 
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affecting battle performance it sometimes resulted in 
commanders being shot by their own troops. Moderating the 
level of corruption was an obvious solution, but Vang Pao 
rejected it. The graft was needed to channel clan loyalties 
to his regime. Instead, he used spies drawn from the 
military arm of his secret police, headed by Toupao Ly (the 
brother of Vang Pao's fourth wife, True Ly), to identify 
disgruntled soldiers with murder in their hearts so they 
could be transferred to other units.{75}  
[135] 
 
Toupao Ly's agents were not unerring, however, and being 
murdered by one's own troops remained a hazard of command. 
One that occurred at Na Khang required Vang Pao's personal 
attention. A former French military base, Na Khang had been 
refurbished and expanded to become Vang Pao's most important 
northern garrison. As the region was a Vang clan enclave, 
many of the troops at the garrison and at its forward bases 
were Vang. A Vang commanded the main garrison, as well as 
all the forward bases, except one. Vang Pao had given 
command of this particular forward base to his brother-in-
law, Chao Ly.  
[136] 
 
Chao Ly was not popular. He robbed soldiers of their pay, 
often beat them, and executed troops for failed missions; 
also, he was haughty toward civilians, most of whom were 
Vang clansmen. A delegation of Vang appealed directly to 
Vang Pao to have Chao Ly removed from command. Vang Pao 
refused. A few days later Chao Ly was dead, murdered by his 
own troops.  
[137] 
 
The ringleader, a junior officer named Tou Vang,{76} fled 
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fiefdom of Chong Khoua Vue, a Vue chieftain who respected no 
authority but his own. Chong Khoua had turned a cold 
shoulder to Touby during his heyday and had attacked Vang 
Pao's troops when they began operations in Muong Mok without 
his permission. Vang Pao stayed clear of the area.  
[138] 
 
Installing a Ly to rule over Vang clansmen was the sort of 
thing that set Chong Khoua's teeth on edge. Having earlier 
turned against Touby for meddling with clan autonomy, he 
jumped at the chance to provide Tou Vang asylum, if for no 
other reason than to thumb his nose at Vang Pao. It did not 
faze him that the murder victim was Vang Pao's brother-in-
law, as well as the brother of Toupao Ly, the ruthless head 
of Vang Pao's secret police whose favorite pastime was 
administering public beatings on the Sam Thong runway to 
troublemakers and malcontents.  
[139] 
 
The Ly clan insisted that Vang Pao go after Tou Vang. Vang 
Pao's own clansmen saw Chao Ly's death as justified homicide 
and wanted nothing done. It was a no-win situation. If Vang 
Pao sent troops against Chong Khoua, he would alienate both 
the Vue and members of his own clan. If he did nothing, he 
would stir up trouble with the Ly. Things would be simpler 
if Tou Vang wasn't at Muong Mok.  
[140] 
 
Vang Pao turned to Sao Hang, a top agent in his secret 
police who hunted down army deserters and delivered them to 
Long Cheng for punishment. In addition to being ruthless, 
Sao had the right family connection: he was Tou Vang's 
brother-in-law. Sao went to Muong Mok and convinced Tou Vang 
that if he returned to Na Khang, Vang Pao would take his 
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all would be made right, Tou Vang climbed aboard the STOL 
aircraft and headed for Na Khang. During the flight, T-28 
fighter planes and helicopters intercepted the STOL and 
forced it to divert to Long Cheng. Representatives of the Ly 
clan were assembled and waiting on the runway. They dragged 
Tou Vang out of the plane and beat him savagely, knocking 
out his teeth and kicking in his ribs. As he lay near death 
on the runway, they finished him off with knives.  
[141] 
 
The Ly were avenged and Sao Hang received a promotion, plus 
blood money. The whole affair left Chong Khoua Vue in a 
rage. He vowed to shoot Vang Pao's troops on sight if they 
ever set foot in Muong Mok. The taunt raised Vang Pao's 
hackles. Chong Khoua had to go. Vang Pao chose a Vue 
clansmen for the job, with an offer of advancement to 
colonel and the position as administrative head of Muong 
Mok, if he pulled it off.  
[142] 
 
It took Cher Tong Vue six months to coax Chong Khoua out of 
Muong Mok to meet with Vang Pao at Long Cheng. Chong Khoua 
arrived with his son Ger Vue and two bodyguards. Cher Tong 
was there to greet him, along with a colonel and a squad of 
soldiers who escorted Chong Khoua to the Long Cheng home of 
a Moua clansman trusted by both sides. Vang Pao was not at 
the house when they arrived. It was common knowledge that 
the general removed himself from the scene when there was to 
be foul play. Chong Khoua told his son to remain outside. If 
there was gunfire, he was to kill anyone who came out.  
[143] 
 
Inside the house the soldiers spread out, backs against the 
walls. Flanked by his two bodyguards, Chong Khoua faced Cher 
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question and demanded that Chong Khoua step down as 
chieftain of Muong Mok or suffer the consequences. Chong 
Khoua glared at him, his whole body shouting "over my dead 
body." A moment later Chong Khoua was lying dead on the 
floor. Cher Tong had shot him with a pistol, point-blank in 
the face. Then Cher Tong was also down, wounded by one of 
Chong Khoua's body guards. There were more gunshots. Cher 
Tong struggled up, blood spurting from his bullet wound, and 
leaped through a window. He landed outside at Ger Vue's 
feet. A stray bullet had wounded Ger in the arm, but he 
could still manage his rifle. He killed Cher Tong before he 
could rise.  
[144] 
 
The gunfire in the house suddenly ceased. One of Chong 
Khoua's bodyguards was dead, but the other one had survived 
to finish off everyone else, including the colonel. He 
yelled to Ger that he was coming out and to hold his fire. 
The Long Cheng police arrived. Ger ignored their shouts to 
drop his rifle. Cher Tong lay at his feet, obviously dead. 
Ger coldly pressed the muzzle of his rifle against Cher 
Tong's head and pulled the trigger.  
[145] 
 
Vang Pao indemnified Ger for his father's death. Though Ger 
accepted the money, he did not forgive. For the rest of the 
war the Vue of Muong Mok denied support of any kind to Vang 
Pao's troops. On the rare occasion when one of Vang Pao's 
helicopters or STOL aircraft landed on the village's 
airfield, the aircraft was searched and the soldiers 
disarmed. The incident also affected Vang Pao's relations 
with Vue clansmen throughout Laos. Many no longer trusted 
him.{77}  
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Danger Signals 
[146] 
 
Five years would pass before Vang Pao's sprawling political 
machine began to unravel. Early on there were danger signals 
that it could not last. Not everything could be manipulated, 
nor all discontent contained.  
[147] 
 
Shortly after assuming command of MR II, Vang Pao tried to 
tame Thao clansmen living south of Long Cheng. They were not 
run-of-the-mill Thao. For generations they had roamed the 
dense stretch of forest between Ban Some and the Phu Bia 
mountains, hunting rather than farming, living off the land 
and constantly on the move. Thousands of these Hmong 
hillbillies had left the forest to settle on the outskirts 
of Phak Khet, Muong Yong, and Ban Houakham, once sleepy 
villages but now overflowing with refugees receiving 
handouts from USAID. Money from military payrolls and a 
hefty black market had energized the local economy. Hmong 
were working as salesmen, clerks, taxi drivers, day 
laborers, dentists, and barbers.  
[148] 
 
The hustle and bustle had attracted Thao huntsmen, drawn not 
only by the economic opportunity but by the concentrated 
population that was mostly non-Thao. Exogamous like all 
Hmong, the forest Thao had difficulty getting brides. Living 
in the wilderness and forever on the go, they were always 
weeks away from settlements with maidens from other clans. 
The population explosion on the western edge of their forest 
haunts drew them like a magnet.  
[149] 
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For more than a decade the forest Thao had been allied with 
Faydang. Deep in their forests there were Pathet Lao supply 
posts, bivouacked troops, and an extensive communications 
network. Thao huntsmen wore the Pathet Lao uniform, so many 
that they constituted the majority of Hmong fighting under 
the crimson standard. The top Hmong officer in the Pathet 
Lao was one of their kinsmen, Saychou Tou Thao.{78}  
[150] 
 
Alarmed by the migration of so many forest Thao into Vang 
Pao's orbit, Faydang tried to lure them back with the 
promise of rapid promotion in the Pathet Lao if they 
returned to their native wilds. Vang Pao wanted them to stay 
put and called on his old ally Sao Chia, the Thao chieftain 
who had earlier rallied Hmong on the southern edge of the 
plain, to prevent a stampede.  
[151] 
 
Sao Chia visited Phak Khet, Muong Yong, and Ban Houakham 
where he linked up with Thao leaders and made tentative 
offers of positions in Vang Pao's growing provincial 
administration to gain their loyalty. He also kept an eye 
out for potential troublemakers. One Thao in particular 
caught his eye‹Shoua Ger, an ambitious young leader with a 
following at Ban Houakham. Sao Chia arranged a meeting to 
feel him out. The man was an opportunist and demanded a high 
post in the district administration for his loyalty. Sao 
Chia was willing to cut a deal but considered Shoua Ger's 
demand excessive; he was also annoyed by the young man's 
imperious attitude. To put him in his place Sao Chia said 
he'd get nothing. It was meant only as the opening round in 
negotiations, but Shoua Ger took it as a final offer.  
[152] 
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missed their target but succeeded in killing ten of Sao 
Chia's bodyguards. Before Vang Pao could retaliate, Shoua 
Ger fled with his supporters (nearly two hundred families) 
into the forest south of Phu Bia to link up with Faydang and 
the Pathet Lao. The communists gave him an outlet for his 
ambition. Shoua Ger assumed command of an all-Hmong unit 
that went on to achieve distinction in combat against RLA 
forces.{79} Over the next ten years Shoua Ger would advance 
through the ranks to become one of the highest ranking Hmong 
officers in the Pathet Lao.  
[153] 
 
Not all disaffected Hmong bolted to the communists (who had 
their own share of Hmong defectors).{80} In early 1965, 
several thousand went over to the Neutralists. The leaders 
of this mass defection were three of Vang Pao's officers 
(all clan chieftains) unhappy with the slow pace of their 
advancement through the ranks. All were from Nong Het and 
had been with Vang Pao from the start. Having recruited 
large numbers of Hmong for his armée clandestine they 
expected to be rewarded with top command positions, but were 
constantly frustrated by Vang Pao's policy of giving field 
commands to clan leaders from the theater of operation.  
[154] 
 
The three officers formed their own units and tried to make 
a deal with the CIA and RLA to get separate funding for 
independent operations against the communists. When they 
were turned away, they approached Kong-Lê. Happy to siphon 
manpower from Vang Pao's guerrilla army, Kong-Lê offered to 
integrate them into his own forces, with the promotions they 
felt they deserved. More than five thousand Hmong arrived at 
Muong Soui, led by the Ly chieftain Chong Vang Ly and two 
leaders of the Vue clan, Leng Vue and Xay Toua Vue.  
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Kong-Lê never fully trusted his new Hmong recruits and 
reneged on integrating them into his army. Instead, he 
organized them as a separate force and billeted them at Phu 
Se, a mountain village near Vang Vieng where they sat out 
the war, spending their days erecting permanent quarters to 
accommodate their families who joined them at the camp. In 
early 1966 the camp was attacked, leaving hundreds killed or 
wounded. The strike was hit-and-run so the identity of the 
attackers was never determined. Some believed the attack was 
ordered by Kong-Lê; others were convinced it was the work of 
Vang Pao.  
[156] 
 
The camp closed in December 1966 when the Neutralist army 
was absorbed into the RLA, leaving the Phu Se Hmong out in 
the cold. No longer on the payroll, they were suddenly 
receptive to Vang Pao's request that they return to the 
fold. Chong Vang Ly and Leng Vue, two of the three 
chieftains who had masterminded the 1965 defection, turned 
down the reunion offer and stayed clear of Long Cheng. The 
third chieftain, Xay Toua Vue, returned to Hao Khame, a 
small village close to Long Cheng. He was murdered shortly 
after he moved in.{81}  
[157] 
 
Other clan leaders would also challenge Vang Pao's 
authority. In 1966 when Vang Pao was away healing from a 
bullet wound, Ly notables conspired to take over Long Cheng. 
Others less bold simply distanced themselves from Vang Pao's 
regime, delivering fewer recruits and dragging their feet in 
the collection of intelligence. In reaction, Vang Pao began 
to question the loyalty of many of his top officers and 
civilian officials.  
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Moua clansmen were a special concern. Because of their 
better education, Vang Pao used them as interpreters for CIA 
agents and American special forces. Now it crossed his mind 
they might be managing the flow of information to 
deliberately limit his ability to make sound judgments. The 
Ly, always too ambitious, were also suspect. And Vang Pao 
had always been wary of the Lo whose clan leader, Faydang, 
was a diehard communist. The Vue weren't to be trusted 
either. Not only had thousands gone over to the Neutralists 
in 1965, Vang Pao had Muong Mok to worry about. Except for 
his own clansmen the only other Hmong Vang Pao completely 
trusted were Thao clansmen faithful to Sao Chia Thao, the 
Thao clan chieftain who was a close personal friend and had 
remained loyal to the last.  
[159] 
 
Between 1969 and 1972, Vang Pao replaced many Moua, Ly, and 
Vue with Vang. He sent Vang children to America and France 
to be educated so they could take the place of Moua 
interpreters, assume top positions in his army and civil 
administration, and manage his personal business 
enterprises.{82} Three of his own sons were in America 
receiving a modern education. One of the boys, Chong, was at 
a military academy being groomed for a top military 
position.  
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65. The Pathet Lao texts are mentioned in Warner, Back Fire, 
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66. Yang Dao, Hmong at the Turning Point, edited by Jeannie 
Blake. (Minneapolis: Worldbridge Associates, 1993), p. 98. 
(return to text)  
 
67. Kuhn, Oral History Interview, p. 24. (return to text)  
 
68. The anthropologist Jan Ovesen found it took on average 
three days for a Hmong to clear a third of an acre of 
wilderness that was not heavily forested. If there were 
large trees, the time required was much longer. See Jan 
Ovesen, A Minority Enters the Nation State (Uppsala Research 
Reports in Cultural Anthropology. No. 14, 1995), p. 53. 
(return to text)  
 
69. Warner, Back Fire, p. 177. (return to text)  
 
70. For the same purpose, Vang Pao later arranged marriages 
between Touby's children and his own. (return to text)  
 
71. For generations, relations between Hmong from Sam Neua 
and Xieng Khouang had been strained. The Sam Neua Hmong 
resented their caricature as artless rustics. The marriage 
was Vang Pao's attempt to break down this barrier of 
distrust and gain cooperation for his expanded guerrilla 
operations in the province. As it turned out, his new bride 
was overwhelmed by life in Long Cheng which was slowly 
evolving into the most densely populated Hmong settlement in 
Laos. She begged to be returned to her mountain village. By 
custom, returning a bride to her family was a breach of 
contract. The prescribed remedy was a fine. Vang Pao had 
already paid a substantial bride price for the woman. As a 
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indemnify the girl's parents for the loss of face and to 
maintain good relations. (return to text)  
 
72. Vang Pao had earlier tried to draw these Moua clansmen 
into his guerrilla network but they wanted nothing to do 
with the war and permitted the Pathet Lao to operate freely 
in their district. To win them over, he hosted a large and 
lavish party in the town, a feast that lasted several days. 
During the festivities, a lovely Moua girl caught his eye 
and became his seventh wife. As with his Sam Neua wife, the 
swarming population of Long Cheng proved too much for the 
new bride and she had to be returned home. Vang Pao paid 
another large fine, sufficiently generous to soothe feelings 
and dispose the villagers of Tase to join the war effort. 
(return to text)  
 
73. Though she would not be his last wife, Hmong fell into 
the habit of referring to her as "Maelot," the Laotian word 
for "last one." (return to text)  
 
74. Zong was a nurse at the field hospital at Vang Vieng. 
Only fifteen, she caught Vang Pao's eye while he was 
visiting wounded soldiers. The two entered into a love 
affair even though Zong was already married to man from the 
Lo clan, Ma Lo. Zong's youthful blush may have animated Vang 
Pao's passion, but it was her family connections that 
prompted the marriage. (return to text)  
 
75. Interview (1988) with a Hmong who wishes to remain 
anonymous. (return to text)  
 
76. This is a pseudonym. (return to text)  
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77. Communication with Ger Vue (1992). (return to text)  
 
78. Gary Y. Lee, "Minority Policies and the Hmong." in 
Martin Stuart-Fox (ed.), Contemporary Laos (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1982), p. 219 (note). (return to text)  
 
79. Interview with Bouayeng Vang (1992). (return to text)  
 
80. As the war progressed, disaffection spread among Hmong 
units in the Pathet Lao. In addition to many desertions, 
some units actually planned to surrender to Vang Pao's 
forces, but as they were seldom allowed to engage Royalist 
Hmong units, they never had the opportunity (interview with 
Xia Vang Vue, 1993). (return to text)  
 
81. Interviews with Fu Ly (1993) and Nao Ying Yang (1992); 
Leng Vue survived the war and immigrated to the United 
States. Still fearing a reprisal for joining the 
Neutralists, he changed his name (1993 interview with a 
member of the Vue clan who wishes to remain anonymous). 
(return to text)  
 
82. Toufu Vang was one of the few Vang who had already been 
educated abroad. He was quickly promoted through the ranks 
of the army and then relieved of duty to spend full time 
cultivating Vang Pao's business concerns. He developed a 
distribution network for the sale of western goods, a sales 
region that eventually encompassed Long Cheng, Ban Some, Pha 
Khao, and Muong Cha. (return to text)  
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Government and chairperson of the Government department at 
Eastern Washington University. His previous books include: 
Coercion (monograph), The Seamy Side of Government, How 
Things Work, Samuel (a novel), and Hmong: History of a 
People. 
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